Abstrucf-To achieve high throughput in wireles networks, smart forwarding and processing of packets in access routers are critical for overcoming the effects of the wireless links. However, these services cannot be provided if data sessions are protected using end-to-end encryption as with IPsec, because the information needed hg these algorithms resides inside the portion of the packet that is encrypted, and can fherefore not be used by the access routers. A previously proposed protocol, called Multi-layered IPsec (ML-IPsec) modifies IPsec in a way sa that certain portions of the datagram may he exposed ta intermediate network elements, enabling these elements to provide performance enhancements. In this paper we extend MLIPsec to deal with mohility and make it suitable for wireless networks. We define and present performance measurements of an efficient key distribution protocol to enable fast MLIPsec session initialization, and two mobility protocols that are compatible with Mobile IP and maintain ML-TPsec sessions. Our measurements show that, depending on the mobility protocol chosen, integrated Mobile IPIML-IPsec handoffs result in a pause of 56-105 milliseconds, of which only 31-85 milliseconds may he attributed to ML-IPsec. Further, we provide detailed discussion and performance measurements of our ML-IPsec implementation. We find the resulting protoCO1 only marginally reduces throughput compered to scenarios in which IPsec is used (4%), and when coupled with SNOOP, greatly increases throughput over scenarios using standard TCP over IPsec (165% on average).
I. INTRODUCTION
Data confidentiality and integrity are two critical issues for wireless, mobile networks. These issues are of growing importance as wireless service providers attempt to increase wireless data traffic by providing mobile VPN services. The most widely accepted method for ensuring data confidentiality md integrity is to pass encrypted data end-to-end using a mechanism such as IPsec [12] .
For wireless networks, smart forwarding and processing of packets are also critical for overcoming the effects of the wireless links, especially highly variable delay and error rates.
Several studies have shown that techniques such as smart scheduling with respect to the iype of data being sent and regulalion of TCP acknowledgment information, can greatly improve end-to-end performance in a wireless network [ll, IS]. However, these services cannot be provided if end-mend encryption is used, such as in IPsec, because the information needed by these algorithms resides inside the portion of the packet that is encrypted, and can therefore not be used by mobile routers. Previous work, called Multi-layered IPsec (ML-IPsec) [203 applies a modified version of IPsec so that certain portions of the user informatjon may be exposed to particular intermediate network elements in a route. In this way, portions of a datagram may be encrypted end-toend, while portions may be read and operated upon by network elements providing performance enhancements. However, the ML-IPsec as defined in 1201 is designed for static environments and does not examine mobility.
In this paper we extend ML-IPsec to deal with mobility and make it suitable for wireless networks. We caIl our resulting protocol Mobile ML-IPsec (MML-IPseci. We make the following four contributions: 1) we define and present performance measurements of an efficient key distribution protocol to enable fast MML-IPsec session initialization; 2) we define and present performance measurements of two mobility protocols that maintain MML-IPsec sessions; 3 ) we provide detailed discussion and performance measurements of our MML-IPsec implementation to quantify its performance impact compared to non-secure communication and communication using IPsec; and 4) we provide a detailed discussion and performance measurements of our implementation of SNOOP, and SNOOP executing over MML-IPsec to quantify the benefits of using MML-IPsec to enable performance enhancing algorithms in a wireless environment.
Our measurements in a wireless environment show that, depending on the mobility protocoI chosen, integrated Mobile IPML-IPsec handoffs result in a pause of 56-305 milliseconds, of which only 31-85 milisaonds may be attributed to MML-IPsec. We found MML-IPsec only marginally reduced throughput compared to scenarios in which no encrypiion is used (9%), or those in which Psec is used (4%), and when coupled with SNOOP? greatly increased throughput over scenarios using standard TCP end-to-end (50% on average), or using TCP over IPsec (165% on average). Our conclusion, based on these results, is that MML-IPsec is a worthwhile protocol to pursue because it enables large performance improvements while providing end-to-end secure transfer of user data. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I1 we present an overview of related and previous work, including a description of ML-IPsec. In Section III we discuss our design of MML-IPsec, our model for integrating Mobile IP with IPsec and MML-IPsec, the software platform on which we base our implementation, and the test bed used to evaluate the performance of the protocols. In Section IV we present 1929 0-7803-8968-9/05/$20.00 (C) 2005 IEEE our key distribution protocol, our two mobility protocols, and characterize their performance. In Section V we present OUT implementations of MML-IPsec and SNOOP and their performance. Section VI concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND
Several studies have shown that the performance of classic data communication protocols can be quit& poor when used over wireless links. In particular. the performance of TCP, the reliable Internet transport protocol, can be degraded by the loss and delay characteristics of a wireless link. Consequently, there have been several efforts aimed at improving the performance of TCP on wireless links. Two of the more promising works do not require any modifications to TCP, but instead perform smart processing (forwarding, filtering, scheduling) on TCP/IP packets based on information gleaned from observing packet flows. In [l] , the authors show that by snooping on TCP/IP packets at the wireless edge, determining when packet loss has occurred by detecting duplicate acknowledgments, and performing fast local retransmissions, TCP performance can be greatly improved.
More recently in 151. it was uncovered that TCP performance is adversely affected by the highly variable delay experienced on the 3G wireless links. The effect is that TCP acknowledgments sent on the uplink tend to be compressed causing them to arrive at transmitters back-to-back. The compression of acknowledgments results in transmitters sending bursts of data. These bursts of data can overflow buffers at the wireless edge resulting in high packet loss. The solution proposed is to regulate the flow of acknowledgments to ensure that buffers do not overflow.
In both of these proposals, the node at the wireless edge must observe information in the TCP header to execute their at least one zone are not limited. Also, there is no limit on the number of zones in a packet, and zones are not required to cover contiguous bits in a packet.
We have somewhat restricted the definition of ML-IPsec to meet the needs of the known methods of enhancing wireless system performance, while keeping the processing complexity low. First, we limit the number of allowed intermediate nodes to a single node, specifically the Mobile IP FA. We choose this node because the vast majority of wireless enhancements operate on a node close to, or supporting a wireless link, and do not require changes to any ocher portion of the network.
Second, we limit the number of zones to two, one for the packet header and one for the payload. The rationale is that most algorithms require access to TCPflP header information, and not packet payload. This restriction can be easily relaxed, Finally, we define zones as contiguous portions of the packet to ease processing. h addition to these changes, we have also defined a key distribution protocol for MML-IPsec and two mobility protocols (Section IV).
B. Integrating Mobile IF: IPsec, and MML-IPsec
We assume that if the basic IPsec is used. the IPsec tunnel extends between the HA and the MH. If MML-IPsec is used, the M a -I P s e c tunnel includes the HA and the MET, while the FA has access to the header part of the TCP/P packet.
In addition, we assume reverse tunneling [151 is used for data transmitted from the MH so that packets in both directions are consistently encrypted. between the HA and the MI-I. When the MH moves to the foreign network, it has to register its COA to the HA. However, the established Psec tunnel prevents the Mobile IP registration message from reaching the FA because every packet, including the Mobile IP registration packet, is encrypted with IPsec. In order to solve this problem? the client software is changed so that the Mobile IP packet is not encrypted. The reestablishment of IPsec tunnel on every handoff will degrade the end-to-end performance because it incurs high handoff latencies.
We propose a different integration model for Mobile IP and IPsec which is then largely re-used for integrating Mobile IP and MML-IPsec. This model is similar to SMN, but does not require changes to the client software. and does not require IPsec tunnels to be re-established after each handoff. To enable Mobile IP registration messages to be received by the FA when an IPSE tunnel is in place between the MH and HA, we add an additional routing entry in the MH and leverage the fact that route selection chooses the route having the longest prefix match among multiple matched entries. When an agent advertisement is received by a MH, it adds a route entry for the FA. The new route entry specifies the FA address as the gateway for all packets destined to the FA. After adding this route, the Mobile IP registration message addressed to the FA will match the new route, and therefore be sent directly to the FA, instead of using the old entry through which packets are encrypted.
To eliminate the need to re-establish IPsec tunnels after each handoff, we leverage the fact that when using Mobile IP, while 
D. Test Bed
To evaluate the performance of our protocols. we set up a lest bed as shown in 
Iv. KEY DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY MANAGEMENT
In this section we present efficient automatic key management protocols for MML-IPsec integrated with Mobile IP. We include procedures for session initialization (ML-IKE) and mobility management. Our goal is to enable fast handoffs while maintaining MML-IPsec sessions. In our model, the nodes involved in the MML-IPsec session are the MH, HA, and FA. The MH and HA have access to both zones in the MML-IPsec packets; the FA serves as the intermediate node and has access to the first zone of the packet containing the TCP/IP header. The key management protocols are responsible for establishing the required SAS between these nodes. and for enabling mobility.
The key management protocols have two phases. In the first phase, a MML-IPsec session is initialized using ML-IKE. This includes determining if a FA will be involved in the secure session, and hence requires the use of MML-[Psec. The second phase of the protocols supports mobility. Once the CSA is established between the MH and HA, the Upon completion of the ML-IKE procedure, data uansmission using MML-IPsec may take place.
B. Proaclive KO Distribution (PKD)
The goal of PKD is to enable a fast handoff by predistributing keys in FAs that are neighbors of the current FA, so lhat very little overhead is incurred during the realtime handoff. For example, in Figure 1 . SA1 is placed in both FA1 and FA2 when the session is established. The distribution of the CSA information to these neighboring FAs is performed after the ML-IKE exchange is complete, so initialization overhead will not be increased. The disadvantage of this approach is that the active key information must be stored in more nodes than are actively being used, thus creating a higher chance of the session key being compromised. 
C. Directed Key Migration (DKM)
Unlike PKD, in DKM the CSA information is only stored in the FA that is actively serving the MH. Therefore, when a MH changes FAs, the CSA must be migrated from the old FA to the new FA in a secure manner. For example, in Figure   1 , SA1 must be moved from FA1 to FA2. This method only requires that the CSA be stored in a single intermediate node, but incurs a higher latency than PKD because more signaling is required during h e handoff. Figure 6 ). The previous FA authenticates the new FA and sends the response to the new FA (flow (5) in Figure 6 ). The response message includes the ML-IPsec CSA including the secret key values, Note that the DKM protocol is processed in parallel with the Mobile IP registration between the new FA, HA and MH.
D. Rekoing and Revocation
There are several reasons why rekeying or key revocation may take place when using MML-IPsec. 
E. Itnplernemtian
We implemented the key exchange protocols (ML-IKE, PKD and DKM) on the test bed shown in Figure 3 . The Dynamic Mobile IP Linux implementation developed by Helsinki University of Technology (HUT) [SI was used in the test bed. Each subnetwork has a different set of wireless configuration parameters such as essid and channel number. The handoff occurs when the wireless configuration parameters are changed. We manually trigger handoffs through a shell script to run controlled experiments.
The implementation consists of several blocks: ML-IKE, PKD, DKM, Key Management, and the interface to MMLIPsec which will be described in the next section. The communication between these blocks is via the Unix Domain Socket in Linux.
ML-KE manages, negotiates, and establishes the MMLIPsec CSA for initialization, while PKD The handoff delay measurements show that a handoff using PKD incurs an additional 31 milliseconds of delay, while a handoff using DKM incurs an extra 85 milliseconds of delay.
These results are encouraging when we consider that these are well within the range of a TCP time-out value.
v. MML-IPSEC IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUAT~ON
In this section. we first present our detailed implementations of the MML-IPsec protocol and SNOOP [ll, and their integration. Then, we present the experimental methodology and the performance evaluation results. As discussed in Section 111, we modified this design to make it suitable for wireless networks, and to account for the fact We create two new data structures, called zone and subzone, to accommodate the zone concept. The data structure for SAS is modified to accommodate the concept of CSA. This is done by including two new fields in the SA data structure ipsec-sa:
One is a pointer to the zonemap for the CSA. and the other is a flag showing whether the SA is a designated SA. Figure 7 shows the modifications to the FreeS/WAN source code for realizing MML-IPsec. We modify three procedures: ipsec-mf), ipsec_rcv_l(), and ipsec_lunnel-startxmir(). The first two is used when a packet i s received, and the last one is used to send a packet. ipsec-rcvO is used for local packet processing, and ipsec-rcv-lO is used for forward packet processing. When the end hodgateway receives a MML-1Psec packet destinated for itself, it uses zpsec-rcvO to decrypt the packet before forwarding it to the transport layer. This requires information about the two zones in the packet.
If an authorized FA receives a MML-IPsec packet for which it has a valid SA, it uses ipsec-rcv-l() to decrypt the first zone o f the packet. At this point, the FA may perform any smart processing, which may need the information contained in the packet header. Once this is done. the first zone of the packet is re-encrypted and the packet is forwarded CO the next hop.
For outgoing processing when sending a packet, ipsec-tunnelstartxmit() is modified to perform encryption and authentication on two zones instead of h e entire packet.
2) l7ie ltnple?irentafion of SNOOP: The SNOOP protocol was first defined in [I] . SNOOP executes in a base station and monitors the TCP header within the packet it is forwarding. The idea behind SNOOP is to detecl errors incurred by the wireless link at the base station, and perform local retransmissions to recover from the errors locally. In this way. the TCP sender will not see the transmission error. resuldng in a larger average window size and hence higher throughput. SNOOP detects errors by observing duplicate acknowledgments. If a duplicate acknowledgment is observed, SNOOP retransmits the subsequent TCP segment from its local buffer: and deletes the duplicate acknowledgment from the traffic sueam. In this way, the lost segment is recovered without an end-to-end TCP retransmission. For details, please refer to [l] .
The SNOOP protocol was firs1 implemented in BSD/OS 2.0. Because our environment, as described in Section 111, is very differenl from that used in the initial implementation, SNOOP needs to be re-implemented. First, the original version of SNOOP was implemented in user space. Because our goal is io integrate SNOOP with MML-IPsec, which is implemented in the kernel, we have to re-implement SNOOP in the Linux kernel.
Second. BSDlOS 2.0 uses a different timer management system. which is not supported in Linux. BSD provides some timer management functions, such as rimout(), which is a user space implementation and can be called directly, but it is not available to kernel programs. We designed a complete set of timer management functions in Linux, including functions for initializing. setting. starting, stopping, clearing, and reselling the timer. and functions that execute a timeout action when the timer expires.
Third, BSD uses the mbrtf data structure and related functions to manage the memory buffers used by the kernel's networkmg subsystem. In Linux, a new data structure called skbuff and a set of related functions are used for this purpose. We carefully re-designed SNOOP using the features of the skdirfldata structure. For example, in order to avoid copying the whole data packet when caching the packet at the base station, we use pskb-copyO to copy and save the data packet, which is similar to the reference counting mechanism in ntbllf. In this way, we also get a private skbiifheader in which we can modify the TOS (Type of Service) field of the I P header to send a locally retransmitted packet with a higher priority, Finally, in order to measure the performance in a controlled environment, we implemented a Poisson-distributed bit-error model to generate errors, similar to that in [l] . The MH generates errors based on the distribution. If an error is generated. the checksum of the data packet is changed. and this packet will later be dropped. function is then called. which has access to the TCP/IP headers in plain text, and the SNOOP protocol is executed. If the packet should be forwarded, the first zone will be re-encrypted before it is transmitted to the next hop.
B. The Experimenral Serup
We use the test bed shown in Figure 3 to evaluate the performance of MMC-IPsec and SNOOP We transferred a large file from a fixed host to a MH with SNOOP running on the base station. A 5MB file was transferred from ftp.redhat.com to the MH, with and without SNOOP running on the base station. Figure 9 shows the results for an average of five runs for different bit error rates, comparing the performance of TCP Reno and TCP Reno with SNOOP. These results match closely with that in [l] . Since we cannot implement MML-IPsec in ftp.reddhat.com, and we want to run experiments in a controlled environment, we modify our test bed as shown Figure 10 Table I11 and IV. Table I11 shows the parameters we use to test SNOOP, and Table IV shows the parameters in evaluating MML-Psec. In Table 111 , the SNOOP Maximum Window, which is the data buffer size in the SNOOP module at the base station, is set to 50. This is large enough to buffer all the data packets sent from the sender so that the SNOOP module is never overloaded.
In the SNOOP module, three timers are running: the local retransmission timer, the persist timer and the garbage timer. The SNOOP Initial RTO (Retransmission TimeOut) is used to set the initial timeout value for the local retransmission timer. The persist timer wilI expire if the SNOOP module does not receive any packets from either the receiver or the sender for a long period of time, When it expires, it will retransmit all the un-acknowledged data packets in its buffer. We set the persist timer to 1 second. The garbage timer is used to clear the buffer for a connection if there is no activity in that connection for a very long period of time. We set the garbage timer to 10 seconds in OUT implementadon.
When testing MML-IPsec, we establish a MML-IPsec connection between TLPl (the MH) and METS (the ftp server).
The packets transmitted in this connection are encrypted using the tunnel-mode ESP encryption protocol. The IP packet is divided into two zones each of which is encrypted separately. As shown in Table IV 
C. Performance Evaluation Results
We use throughput as the metric IO evaluate the performance of different configurations. To further explain the reason behind these results, we also illustrate the TCP congestion window size and the TCP sequence number of different configurations. 1) "@put: Figure 11 compares the throughput of different configurations under different bit-error rates. From the figure, we see that SNOOP greatly improves the performance of TCP Reno when the error rate is high. For example, when the bit-error rate is 1.53 x IOm5 (1-bit error in 64K bits). the throughput with SNOOP is three times higher than that without SNOOP In fact, TCP Reno wrth SNOOP always achieves a (1-bit error in SMb). SNOOP achieves 10% higher throughput than regular TCP Reno.
From the curves of IPsec and MML-IPsec, we can see that when no error exists, the overhead of these two protocols are about 5% and 9%. respectively. As the bit-error rate increases, the throughput of both protocols drops dramatically. It is interesting to see that when the bit-error rate is higher than
x
(1-bit error in 2Mb), the throughput of IPsec and MML-IPsec is almost the same in most cases, For example, when the bit-error rate is 1-bit error per 2Mb. the throughput of both approaches drop by 27%. When the bit-error rate is 1-bit error per 64Kb, their throughput drops by 62%. This is because the overhead incurred by the error is more significant than the overhead incurred by encryptionldecryption.
When SNOOP is integrated with MML-IPsec. the throughput is higher than either TCP Reno over MML-IPsec or IPsec. SNOOP integrated with MML-IPsec can deliver as much as five times higher throughput than that without SNOOP. Even when the error rate is low, SNOOP integrated with MML-IPsec can improve the performance by 19% and 14% compared to TCP over MML-IPsec and IPsec, respectively.
From the figure. we can also see that in an error-prone environment, SNOOP over MML-IPsec always achieves higher throughput than TCP Reno alone. The improvement increases as h e bit-error rate increases. Figure 11 shows that SNOOP over MMt-IPsec increases the throughout by 3% to 108% for different bit-error rates.
These results conclusively show that in a wireless errorprone environment, by integrating performance enhancing algorithms such as SNOOP with MML-IPsec we can achieve security and performance simultaneously.
2 ) TCP Seqitence Number: Figure 12 shows the evolution of TCP sequence number versus time with different configurations when the bit-error rate is 1 . ! . I x lop6 (1 -bit error in 512k bits). From the figure, we can see that if SNOOP i s running, the sequence number progresses much faster than that without SNOOP. For instance, when SNOOP is integrated with MMLIPsec, the sequence numbers increase at twice the rate of TCP with IPsec.
3) TCP Congestion Window Size: Figure 13 shows the size of the congestion window versus time at the ftp server with a bit-error rate of 1.9 x
(1-bit error in 512K bits). This while TCP Reno's is about 6. This can be explained as follows.
In SNOOP, the base station caches all the data packets before forwarding them to the MH over the wireless link. When the base station detects a packet lossi it will retransmit the packets to the MH from its local cache and suppress the duplicate ACKs. In this way, the sender's congestion control mechanisms. such as fast retransmit and fast recovery, will not be invoked. Thus. SNOOP prevents the congestion window from shrinking. In the case of pure TCP Reno, wireless loss will be treated as congestion in the network. Whenever a packet is lost or three duplicate ACKs are received, the transmitter will drop the congestion window size to balf and then increase the window size gradually. Figure 13 (a) also shows that the congestion window size of SNOOP drops to two on several occasions. This is because of timeouts at the sender. Sender timeout occurs when the congestion window is very large and there are several packet losses in the same sending window. When the congestion window size is large, for example 40, a packet loss will generate as many as 39 duplicate ACKs if all the packets after the lost packet are received correctly. Our tests shows that to process all these duplicate ACKs requires up to ten times of the normal packet processing time. Therefore, packets transmitted after the lost packet will experience a long round-trip time and it is possible that the timer for these packets will expire before getting acknowledged. In such cases, the sender will fall back to the slow start phase and reduce the congestion window to two.
From Figure 13 (b), we can also see that when integrated with MML-IPsec, SNOOP has a much larger congestion window size than pure MML-IPsec, which can be also explained as above. The figure shows that the integration of SNOOP increases the average congestion window size of the MML-IPsec protocol by a factor of five. from 5 to 26. The improvement in the congestion window size shown here also explains the dramatic performance improvement achieved in Figure 11 , which shows that the throughput of MML-IPsec with SNOOP is increased by 170% compared to without 
VI. CONCLUSIOKS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a simplified version of MLIPsec, an efficient key distribution protocol for initializing secure wireless sessions, and two protocols for managing mobility for these secure sessions. We call this suite of protocols MML-IPsec. We showed through extensive performance testing of our implementations of these protocols that MMlt- 
